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Abstract
We study long-run learning in an experimental Cournot game with no explicit information
about the payoﬀ function. Subjects see only the quantities and payoﬀs of each oligopolist after
every period. In line with theoretical predictions and previous experimental ﬁndings, duopolies
and triopolies both reach highly competitive levels, with price approaching marginal cost within
50 periods.
Using the new ConG software, we extend the horizon to 1,200 periods, far beyond that
previously investigated. Already after 100 periods we observe a qualitative change in behavior,
and quantity choices start to drop. Without pausing at the Cournot-Nash level quantities
continue to drop, eventually reaching almost fully collusive levels in duopolies and often reaching
deep into collusive territory for triopolies. Fitted models of individual adjustment suggest that
subjects switch from imitation of the most proﬁtable rival to other behavior that, intentionally or
otherwise, facilitates collusion via eﬀective punishment and forgiveness. Remarkably, subjects
never learn the best-reply correspondence of the one-shot game. Our results suggest a new
explanation for the emergence of cooperation.
Keywords: Cournot oligopoly, imitation, learning dynamics, cooperation.
JEL Codes: C73, C91, D43.
∗We are grateful to the National Science Foundation for support under grant SES-0925039, James Pettit for
programming the software, Luba Petersen for assistance in running the sessions, conference participants at the 2012
American Economic Association Meetings, the 6th Nordic Conference on Behavioral and Experimental Economics
in Lund 2011, the 2012 Santa Barbara Conference on Experimental and Behavioral Economics, seminar audiences
at Alicante, Cambridge, Edinburgh, Frankfurt, Carlos III, CERGE-EI, Pompeu Fabra, Queen Mary, Stirling, UCL,
Baruch College and the WZB. Weidenholzer acknowledges ﬁnancial support from the Vienna Science and Technology
Fund (WWTF) under project fund MA 09-017.
1
1 Introduction
Imitation is an attractive heuristic when players have little information about the strategic envi-
ronment but can observe others' choices and success. Compared to popular learning models that
focus on own payoﬀs, imitation makes more comprehensive use of available information  but not
necessarily better use, as ﬁrst shown by Vega-Redondo (1997) for the case of Cournot games where
imitation generates the perfectly competitive Walrasian outcome.
In this paper we show how subjects, although initially attracted to imitation, learn their way out
of it, and eventually acquire heuristics that not only avoid the pitfalls of extreme competition but
also enable them to cooperate. The cooperation we see emerges only in the long run, beyond the
horizons previously investigated. Interestingly, cooperation does not seem to be supported by Nash
reversion or similar strategies; indeed the evidence suggests that our subjects never even learn the
best response function. Instead, they eventually gravitate to heuristics that are no more complicated
than imitation, but that align incentives and enable a form of punishment and forgiveness.
We study Cournot games as they are of special interest not only to industrial organization the-
orists but also from a wider view. Within the broad class of aggregative games (Alós-Ferrer and
Ania 2005), Cournot games are notable for a tension between social eﬃciency and individual opti-
mization. (Since consumers are not considered players in such games, social eﬃciency refers to the
players' joint payoﬀ maximum at the cartel proﬁle.) The eﬃcient proﬁle contrasts to the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium, but there is an even less eﬃcient proﬁle of interest  the fully competitive or
Walrasian outcome. Vega-Redondo showed that imitating quantity choices of the more proﬁtable
players leads precisely to that least eﬃcient proﬁle, where economic proﬁts are zero.
Of course, this unfortunate outcome arises from a blind spot in the imitation heuristic  it
ignores the fact that prices fall with greater quantities. Nevertheless, the heuristic has been quite
descriptive of laboratory behavior reported by several authors in low-information environments
where players observe other players' quantity choices and proﬁts but not the underlying payoﬀ
function. Most of these studies feature what has been considered long horizon repeated interaction
of around 50 periods (see, for example, Huck, Normann, and Oechssler 1999, Oﬀerman, Potters,
and Sonnemans 2002, or Apesteguía, Huck, and Oechssler 2007).
Our point of departure is to examine a much longer horizon. We employ the new ConG software
(Pettit, Friedman, Kephart, and Oprea 2012) which allows for periods to be so short that human
subjects perceive action as taking place in continuous time. Here we instead use the software to
implement discrete 4-second periods  rather short by recent standards, but perceived by our
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subjects as comfortable stop-action in discrete time. This enables us to increase the number of
periods to 1,200.
The results are dramatic  what looked like stable long-run behavior in earlier studies turns out
to be transient. In the ﬁrst 50 periods of our experiment we replicate the very competitive outcomes
observed in previous studies. However, soon thereafter the trend reverses and quantity choices start
to drop. Quantities often approach the Cournot-Nash level after 100 periods but they do not halt
there, or even pause. Rather they continue to drop until they reach almost fully collusive levels in
duopolies and reach, on average, deep into collusive territory in triopolies.
The primary contribution of the present paper is to document that transition in outcomes. The
transition illustrates the importance of very long horizons in low information environments, and it
also sheds light on an important general question: how can players learn to abandon dysfunctional
heuristics and ﬁnd diﬀerent rules that better reconcile group interest with self interest?
With that general question in mind, we also examine individual behavior before and after the
transition, using known models of dynamic adjustment. We show how subjects abandon the tempt-
ing but fallacious imitation heuristic and instead combine two other modes of behavior: simple
matching of others' quantities, and a basic algorithm (win-continue, lose-reverse) that responds to
the proﬁtability of the previous quantity adjustment. Together, these two heuristics move quantities
towards the collusive region. They eﬀectively make subjects more mindful of future consequences
of their current actions: subjects learn that deviations from cooperation are not very proﬁtable as
they are quickly matched (an eﬀective punishment) and that repentance brings forgiveness (as a
return to cooperation is also matched).
The next section reviews static theory relevant to our experiment, and computes the three
benchmark outcomes: the joint proﬁt maximum (JPM), the Cournot Nash equilibrium (CNE), and
the perfectly competitive Walrasian outcome (PCW). The section then discusses several well known
heuristics intended to describe individual adaptation in low-information environments like ours.
The heuristics include Vega-Redondo's imitate-the-best-max (IMIT), matching the average action
played by others (MATCH) and win-continue lose-reverse (WCLR). The section also notes some
standard adaptation models that require more information, such as myopic best response (BR), and
forward-looking repeated game strategies such as Tit-for-Tat (TFT). The section concludes with
a discussion of observable consequences and hypotheses that motivate our experiment.
Section 3 lays out our laboratory procedures. It describes the ConG user interface we used as well
as matching procedures and treatments. Section 4 summarizes results. It shows that initially play
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becomes very competitive, consistent with Vega-Redondo's IMIT, but that subjects subsequently
change behavior and obtain much more eﬃcient outcomes. Section 5 analyzes the transition in
terms of the individual adaptation models.
Section 6 discusses our ﬁndings, which do not trivially vindicate standard repeated game theory.
Although we observe clear end-game eﬀects that demonstrate that subjects are aware of last rounds
and are aware of (stage game) proﬁtable deviations from cooperation, we ﬁnd that our subjects do
not understand Nash reversion. Indeed, they never learn crucial parts of the best-reply correspon-
dence of the stage game, let alone its Nash equilibrium. Nevertheless, subjects do become more
sophisticated over time in that they enjoy ever-longer spells of collusive play with more eﬀective
and shorter punishment phases.
Appendix A contains supplemental data analysis, Appendix B uses simulations to examine
identiﬁcation issues in the data, and Appendix C reproduces instructions to subjects. On-line
Appendix D collects supplementary mathematical derivations.
2 Perspectives from Received Theory
We study a repeated Cournot game played by a ﬁxed ﬁnite number n ≥ 2 of strategically identical
players with constant marginal cost c ≥ 0. Each period, each player i chooses a quantity xi in a
ﬁnite interval [xL, xU ]. Price P is a decreasing function of the aggregate quantity X =
∑n
j=1 xj ,
and player i's proﬁt that period is pii = a+ (P (X)− c)xi, including an exogenous additive constant
a that captures beneﬁts from other activities net of ﬁxed cost. Our experiment uses n = 2 or 3, the
interval [xL, xU ] = [0.1,
12
n ], a = c = 10, and unit elastic demand with XP (X) = 120, so
pii(xi, x−i) = 10 +
(
120∑
j xj
− 10
)
xi. (1)
2.1 Static predictions
Maximal quantity choice xi = xU =
12
n by every player i yields the minimal price P =
120
nxU
= 10
equal to marginal cost. Associated minimal proﬁts are piPCWi = a + 0 = 10 for every player. We
refer to this action proﬁle as the perfectly competitive Walrasian outcome (PCW).
At the other extreme of the action space, minimal quantity choice xi = xL = 0.1 by every player
i yields the maximal price P = 120nxL = 1200/n and indeed maximal total proﬁts npi
JPM
i = 9n+ 120.
We call this proﬁle the joint proﬁt maximum (JPM).
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Table 1: Static outcomes for payoﬀ function (1)
Duopoly Triopoly
xi P pii xi P pii
JPM 0.1 600 69 0.1 400 49
CNE 3 20 40 2.66¯ 15 23.3¯
PCW 6 10 10 4 10 10
The best response of player i to X−i =
∑
j 6=i xj is the unique solution x∗i = b(X−i) ∈ [0.1, 12n ] to
the ﬁrst-order condition
0 =
∂pii
∂xi
=
120
xi +X−i
− 10− 120xi
(xi +X−i)2
, (2)
and is given by
b(X−i) = 2
√
3X−i −X−i. (3)
Imposing the relevant symmetry condition xi +X−i = nxi in (2) and solving for xi, we obtain the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium proﬁle as xCNEi =
12(n−1)
n2
. The corresponding price is PCNE = 10nn−1 ,
and the resulting equilibrium proﬁt for each player is piCNEi = a+
10
n−1 · xCNEi = 10 + 120n2 . Table 1
summarizes these static predictions for the duopoly (n = 2) and triopoly (n = 3) cases.
Compared to a linear demand speciﬁcation, the unit elastic demand embodied in payoﬀ function
(1) has three important advantages for experimental work. First, as shown in Table 1, it gives a
clean separation between the three static outcomes of interest. Second, it creates a much stronger
temptation to defect at the JPM. Finally, for n < 6, the payoﬀ function is not as ﬂat around the best
response. See on-line Appendix D for details on the limitations arising from a linear speciﬁcation
of the demand function.
2.2 Dynamic adjustment models
The existing theoretical literature oﬀers a variety of predictions regarding which outcomes will
emerge as players react to other players' choices and proﬁts in Cournot games like (1). Among these,
the best supported in previous low information experiments is the simple heuristic of imitating the
choice of the player who earned the highest payoﬀ among all players last period. This heuristic,
ﬁrst analyzed by Vega-Redondo (1997), is often referred to as imitate-the-best-max. Below we will
refer to it as IMIT. Vega-Redondo's model also allows agents from time to time to make mistakes
and choose a quantity diﬀerent from the one prescribed by the imitation rule. He shows that as the
error rate goes to zero, the limit of the dynamic process spends almost all time in the PCW proﬁle.
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Indeed, convergence is global and rapid: from any other proﬁle, a single player choosing xU one
period will, except perhaps for a few transitory mistakes, immediately be imitated by all players,
and single deviations from the PCW proﬁle will never be imitated under Vega-Redondo's (1997)
rule. Apesteguía, Huck, and Oechssler (2007) show that PCW is also the unique stochastically
stable outcome for a wide range of other imitation rules, including Schlag's (1998) proportional
imitation rule, and the imitate-the-best-average rule of Eshel, Samuelson, and Shaked (1998).
Alós-Ferrer and Ania (2005) show that stochastic stability of the PCW outcome follows also from
the fact that it is a strict ﬁnite-population ESS in the sense of Schaﬀer (1988). That is, unilateral
deviations from the PCW proﬁle (xU , xU , . . . , xU ) satisfy the strict payoﬀ inequality
pii(x
′|
n−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
xU , . . . , xU ) < pii(xU |x′,
n−2︷ ︸︸ ︷
xU , . . . , xU )
for all x′ 6= xU , i.e., the deviator earns a lower payoﬀ than the non-deviators.
The intuition behind these stability results is simple. All ﬁrms in Cournot oligopoly face the
same price, and as long as that price is above marginal cost, the most proﬁtable ﬁrm is the one with
the largest quantity. Imitation will therefore lead ﬁrms to increase quantities, driving price down
to marginal cost. (Price below marginal cost is not possible with our restricted strategy space, but
even if it were, the ﬁrm with the smallest quantity would be the most proﬁtable, and once again
imitation would drive the price back towards marginal cost.) In our game PCW is the unique proﬁle
where price equals marginal cost. At any other feasible proﬁle, a deviation towards the PCW choice
xU will give the deviator higher proﬁts than the non-deviators. Moreover, as just noted in the ESS
discussion, any single deviation from PCW earns the deviator smaller proﬁt than the non-deviators.
Thus the PCW outcome is the only stochastically stable state, and is relatively robust to mistakes.
Though IMIT is theoretically prominent and empirically successful, many competing adjust-
ment rules are available. One such alternative is an even simpler variety of imitation: simply match
average actions independently of payoﬀs. There are a number of possible reasons for such behav-
ior. A player's utility might be subject to conformism biases (Bernheim 1994), or players might
use popularity weighting (Ellison and Fudenberg 1993) in their decision process. Forward looking
subjects may even strategically adopt such a rule as a simple (and salient) way of committing to
matching movements towards collusion and deterring deviations in the other direction. Variations
on the theme include moving towards the action of a randomly chosen other player, or towards
the average action among all other players. For speciﬁcity, we will refer to that last variation as
MATCH, and include it in our list of heuristics.
For n > 2 , the stationary points of MATCH, like other unconditional imitation processes, are
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symmetric (monomorphic) states, where all players make the same choice. The set of all symmetric
states is connected via (a chain of) single deviations. Thus, under MATCH, every symmetric state,
including PCW, is stochastically stable for n > 2. For the n = 2 (duopoly) case, there are also
stochastically stable periodic states, which we call blinkers, in which the two players players swap
actions every period.
The heuristics discussed so far respond to the current choices and payoﬀs of all players, but
there are other heuristics that use even less information. Players might respond only to their own
past strategies and payoﬀs, and ignore (or be unaware of) those of other players. For instance, they
might simply adjust their actions based on the success of the last adjustment. Huck, Normann, and
Oechssler (2003, 2004) propose an adaptive process that we shall call win-continue lose reverse
(WCLR): agents keep moving in the direction of a previous quantity change if it resulted in an
increase in earnings and move in the opposite direction otherwise. WCLR is related to learning
direction theory, as ﬁrst proposed by Selten and Buchta (1998). The distinction is that learning
direction theory has players move in the direction of a better reply, which requires counterfactual
knowledge. By contrast, WCLR relies only on direct personal experience in the current period plus
memory of one's own action and proﬁt in the previous period; it does not require any knowledge of
the best reply function.
Huck, Normann, and Oechssler (2003, 2004) show that players following WCLR converge to the
JPM proﬁle if they move simultaneously (and to the CNE proﬁle if they move in an alternating
fashion). The intuition for JPM convergence is easy to understand in duopoly, where it prevents
players from systematically increasing their separation. As opposite movements keep the price
unchanged, it is impossible that the large ﬁrm increases its proﬁt through a higher quantity if the
smaller ﬁrm increases its proﬁts through a smaller quantity. Moreover, when ﬁrms move in the same
direction, it will be the leading ﬁrm (the larger ﬁrm for upward movements, the smaller ﬁrm for
downward movements) that is going to reverse ﬁrst. Hence, over time quantity separation shrinks.
Eventually players choose the same quantities, and thereafter any (joint) movement towards the
JPM outcome will continue while any movement away from it will result in lower proﬁts and hence
reverse direction. On the other hand, if the protocol calls for players to alternate moves, then this
sort of entrainment cannot occur. WCLR then leads players towards their best response, eventually
resulting in convergence to the CNE proﬁle.
Cournot (1830) assumed that each player always knows enough about the payoﬀ function to best
respond to the current proﬁle of other players' choices. Standard learning models generalize this
approach mainly by allowing for strategic uncertainty. For example, ﬁctitious play (Brown 1951,
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Robinson 1951) postulates that next period's choice is a best response, not to the proﬁle experienced
this period, but rather to the time-average action proﬁle over the current and all previous periods.
Thus it requires memory as well as counterfactual knowledge of payoﬀs.
It is well known in games similar to ours that the CNE is the unique point in the serially undom-
inated set, i.e., the set of strategies that survives the elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
On-line Appendix D extends that result to our game. Milgrom and Roberts (1991) show that any
process of adaptive learning (including ﬁctitious play and Cournot's best response process) con-
verges to the serially undominated set, i.e. to the CNE. Thus in our game, the CNE is a global
attractor of such processes, or (in stochastic versions of the models with small noise amplitude) a
neighborhood of CNE is stochastically stable. As shown by Beggs (2005), a further consequence
is that reinforcement learning (Erev and Roth 1998) which, of course, requires no counterfactual
knowledge of the payoﬀ function, also converges to the CNE.
2.3 Questions and Hypotheses
Which adjustment rule best describes actual behavior in these games? From our perspective, this
may be the wrong question to ask. Though we often conceive of agents in models (and subjects
in experiments) as followers of consistent adaptive rules, there is no reason in principle that this
need be the case. Adaptive rules that seem natural to the inexperienced may lead to undesirable
outcomes. In such cases, including ours, it seems reasonable to conjecture that moderately sophis-
ticated subjects will eventually abandon such rules, once their pathological consequences become
apparent. Such transitions have seldom been considered in the literature.
Low information Cournot games are prime examples of environments that inspire usage of de-
structive heuristics. The literature contains robust evidence that IMIT-like rules govern behavior
in experiments lasting 40-60 periods. Increasing adherence to the IMIT heuristic results in steadily
rising quantities and substantial reductions in proﬁts. These games are therefore an ideal testbed
for our conjecture.
Our central question is whether, given enough experience, subjects will learn to abandon IMIT
and thereby collectively escape from the low earnings at the PCW outcome. Our primary empirical
hypothesis is that, though subjects will initially trend towards Walrasian quantities as in previous
studies, they will eventually move towards CNE or even JPM quantities, increasing their proﬁts in
the process.
Were this to occur, a second question the arises: what do subjects do instead, once they abandon
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Figure 1: Screenshot from ConG software.
IMIT? One possibility is that they will develop a crude sense of their best response functions with
experience, switch to the BR heuristic, and thus converge to the more proﬁtable CNE proﬁle. If
subjects are more sophisticated yet, they might use their newfound knowledge of the best response
function to implement repeated game strategies like tit-for-tat, leading to even higher earnings at
the JPM.
On the other hand, subjects might not learn their best response function at all, switching instead
to simpler heuristics. Subjects might learn to ignore their counterparts entirely, adopting WCLR,
leading to eventual collusion (or to CNE). Or subjects could adopt MATCH, perhaps leading to
some degree of collusion.
In order to detect these sorts of changes in heuristics, we will estimate simple econometric models
on early, intermediate and late data and study whether these reveal signiﬁcantly diﬀerent patterns
of adjustment. Appendix B provides evidence that such econometric exercises, conducted on sim-
ulations of agents following IMIT, BR, MATCH and WCLR heuristics, are capable of identifying
and diﬀerentiating these behaviors to a reasonable degree. Our second main hypothesis, then, is
that we will observe evidence of signiﬁcantly diﬀerent rules governing period-to-period adjustment
in earlier versus later periods of play.
3 Laboratory procedures
In order to provide a window into long-run behavior, our subjects play Cournot games for hundreds
of periods, far more than in any previous experiment on this topic of which we are aware. To make
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this feasible in the span of a two-hour session, we introduced several new features using the ConG
software package (Pettit et al. 2012). Figure 1 shows a screenshot that illustrates three key features:
• In order to allow subjects to instantly process information, previous-period actions and payoﬀs
are shown to subjects via an intuitive graphical interface. The x-axis represents quantity
choices and color coded tick marks show each subject's previous-period quantity choice, e.g.,
the subject's own choices are shown in green. The y-axis represents proﬁts: the heights of dots
(color matched to x-axis ticks) represents previous-period proﬁts, and small font text next to
the dot gives the exact amount.
• Second, all periods are time limited at four seconds. A timer bar above the quantity/proﬁt
graph ﬁlls in over the course of the period; once it is ﬁlled the period is over. During the
period subjects can adjust their actions as often as they like; the payoﬀ-relevant actions are
those seen when the period ends. Immediately thereafter subjects see the actions and payoﬀs
achieved in that period by themselves and their fellow oligopolists.
• Third, in order to allow subjects to register decisions instantly, subjects make quantity choices
by simply clicking on the screen (or dragging the hollow-box slider at the bottom of the screen).
The set of available quantities is nearly continuous, with a granularity of less than 0.007 units
over the interval [0.1, 6] in the Duopoly treatment and [0.1, 4] in the Triopoly treatment.
When subjects choose not to adjust quantities they can maintain the status quo simply by
not clicking on the screen at all.
Several comments are worth making about the design choices. First, the 4 second time limit was
shown in extensive piloting to steer safely between the twin pitfalls of time pressure and boredom.
Subjects did not seem hurried or frantic during game play and, in informal post-experiment in-
terviews, expressed comfort with the pacing of the game. Second, this comfort is supported by
a carefully constructed graphical interface designed to make information dissemination and action
quicker than in standard implementations. Visualization makes subjects almost instantly aware
of the actions and payoﬀs of all members of their group while the point-and-click interface allows
subjects to register decisions in a fraction of a second. Third, subjects were not forced to make
a new decision in each period as previous quantity decisions were automatically maintained each
period unless changed. Thus, at very low cost, subjects could stand still for several periods while
thinking about their decisions, reducing time pressure signiﬁcantly. Finally, the evidence in section
4 shows that during the ﬁrst 50 periods of play, our experiment yields data very similar to that
seen previous experiments. This similarity reassures us that our design choices do not drastically
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reshape behavior.
The new design features, however, allowed us to run 1,200 periods in less than two hours.
We employed 72 subjects in six sessions of twelve subjects each at the LEEPS laboratory at the
University of California, Santa Cruz in April 2011. In half of the sessions we matched subjects
exclusively into duopolies and in the other half into triopolies, i.e. we ran two treatments using
a completely between-subject design. Our matching algorithm grouped subjects into independent
silos of six subjects each. Subjects interacted only with subjects in their own silos, thereby giving
us six completely independent groups in each treatment. Each 1,200 period session is divided into
three 400 period blocks. At the beginning of each block, subjects are rematched to new counterparts
in their silo, and no subject interacts more than once with the same counterpart(s).
Because our focus is on adaptation to low-information environments, we told subjects very little
about their payoﬀ functions. Using clear but non-technical language, we told them only that the
functions were symmetric, time-invariant and determined uniquely by the [quantity] choices of the
group members. Subjects were students from all ﬁelds and recruited online via ORSEE (Greiner
2004). Instructions, read aloud to the subjects at the beginning of the session, are reproduced in
Appendix C. Subjects were paid their average earnings in each of the three blocks at the rate of 12
US cents per point in Duopoly and 18 cents in Triopoly. We paid an additional a show-up fee of
$5. On average, sessions lasted just under two hours and subjects earned $21.00.
4 Aggregate results
We ﬁrst analyze the very beginning of the experiment in order to see whether there are any qualita-
tive diﬀerences between our data and earlier Cournot experiments in low-information environments.
The left-hand panel of Figure 2 plots median quantities from the Duopoly treatments while the
right-hand panel does the same for Triopoly in the ﬁrst 25 periods of the experiment. In Appendix
A we plot the evolution of median proﬁts in the same manner.
Markets become very competitive within just a few periods and stabilise in the competitive
region between Cournot-Nash and Walras. This is not only true for the overall medians but for
all market groups in both treatments. There are slight diﬀerences between duopolies and triopolies
with the latter being even closer to Walras than the former. There are some triopoly markets where
price is equal to marginal costs for sustained periods of time. To statistically establish the initial
rise in quantities, note that median quantities rise from the ﬁrst to the 20th period for each of the
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Figure 2: Median quantities in the ﬁrst 25 periods
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six independent matching groups in each treatment. This diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant at the
one percent level in both cases by a paired Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test. Over the next 25 periods,
median quantities continue to ﬂuctuate in the Walrasian region above Cournot-Nash. Thus, over
the ﬁrst 50 periods we see essentially the same trends as in earlier studies. This is despite the
fact that in those studies it took over an hour to run 50 periods, versus about 3 minutes in our
experiment.
Result 1 Median action choices initially trend upwards, and within 25 periods are much closer to
PCW levels than to CNE levels in both duopolies and triopolies.
Figure 3 plots median quantities over the full 1,200 periods of our experiment. Each dot rep-
resents the median from a 25-period window. The three blocks are indicated through dotted lines.
Analogous proﬁt series can be found in Appendix A.
In Duopoly, there is a stark contrast between the ﬁrst ﬁfty periods and the long-run. Highly
competitive outcomes as predicted by Vega-Redondo's IMIT are only observed in the ﬁrst 50 periods.
After that average quantity choices start to drop sharply. Quantities continue to fall even after
crossing the Cournot-Nash level, and in periods 300-380 are much closer to full collusion than
to Cournot-Nash. Of course, the median could hide some interesting heterogeneity. However,
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Figure 3: Median quantities in all periods, plotted in 25 period bins.
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inspection of individual groups reveals that none of our matching groups spent any signiﬁcant time
systematically close to the CNE. More on this below and in Appendix A.2.
In the second block, collusion becomes prevalent much more quickly; in some duopolies it is
nearly perfect and remarkably stable for long intervals of time. Collusion is even more pronounced
in the third block.
In Triopoly, quantities again start to trend downwards after the intense competition of the ﬁrst
50 periods. However, the decline of quantities (and the rise of proﬁts) is much slower than in
Duopoly and never approaches full collusion on average (although there is one group of subjects
that colludes perfectly in the last block). Also, heterogeneity across groups is much greater than in
Duopoly, especially in the last block. Nevertheless there is a systematic trend that takes subjects
deep into the collusive territory between Cournot-Nash and the joint proﬁt maximum.
To statistically establish the secular drop in quantities, note that the median quantities fall from
the ﬁrst to the ﬁnal block in each of the six independent matching groups in each treatment. This
diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level in both cases by a paired Wilcoxon
Signed-Rank test.
Table 2 summarizes our aggregate results. It shows median quantities, prices, and proﬁts for
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Table 2: Median quantities, prices, and proﬁts
Duopoly Triopoly
Periods Quantity Price Proﬁt Quantity Price Proﬁt
1− 50 4.54 13.98 23.74 3.46 12.52 16.52
1− 400 3.17 18.43 35.45 3.11 13.59 18.66
401− 800 0.57 90.01 63.11 2.74 14.60 21.20
801− 1, 200 0.28 107.36 68.53 2.08 18.70 26.73
1151− 1200 0.40 91.30 68.51 2.03 19.44 23.03
the three blocks and also for the ﬁrst and last 50 periods only. An analogous table reporting means
can be found in Appendix A.
Result 2 After peaking in the ﬁrst 25-50 periods, quantities in both Duopoly and Triopoly begin
a long decline towards the collusive JPM level. Median quantities closely approximate JPM by the
ﬁnal block in Duopoly, while in Triopoly median quantities fall nearly by half, and remain well below
the CNE level.
Figure 3 also shows both end-game and restart eﬀects. Subjects collude despite being aware of
the ﬁnite nature of the game. And subjects do not revert to the same level of cooperation once they
have been rematched. Rather they enter with more cautious quantities and engage in an adaptive
process that leads them gradually towards more cooperative outcomes.
Figure 4 reveals another aspect of the aggregate data. It plots the likelihood that a subject
adjusts quantity in period t+ 1 as a function of her quantity choice in period t. A separate series is
plotted using data from the ﬁrst 25 periods (in red) and using data from the ﬁnal block (in black).
Circles around points are scaled in size to the proportion of subjects holding the corresponding
quantity in period t.
Highly competitive choices are most persistent in the ﬁrst 25 periods, consistent with IMIT, in
both duopolies and triopolies. The pattern changes dramatically by the ﬁnal block. In Duopoly
persistence completely reverses, with collusive quantities becoming most persistent and Walrasian
quantities least persistent. In Triopoly, where group heterogeneity is more challenging, the relation-
ship becomes almost ﬂat, with slightly stronger persistentce near cartel levels than near Walrasian
levels. Still, the change from early period behavior is striking.
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Figure 4: Stability of quantities.
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Figure 4 illustrates a second important trend in the data. Subjects are considerably less likely
to change their quantities later in the experiment than earlier. This suggests subjects approach
a behavioral equilibrium with experience, particularly in Duopoly where colluding subjects rarely
change their quantities.
Result 3 Quantities are less variable later in the session. Early in the session, quantities near
the PCW level are the most persistent, but late in the session, quantities near JPM are the most
persistent.
5 Analyzing the dynamics
5.1 Individual adjustments in the experiment
To better understand the transition in aggregate behavior, we investigate the underlying individual
heuristics, beginning with BR and MATCH. Figure 5 plots counterpart quantity in period t− 1 on
the x-axis and own quantity in period t on the y-axis. Median responses are plotted in solid red
15
Figure 5: Median quantities in Duopoly
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Figure 6: Median quantities in Triopoly
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and 25th and 75th percentile in dotted red. For reference we plot the BR prediction in blue and
the MATCH prediction as the dotted main diagonal.
The left panel shows data from the ﬁrst 25 periods. Quantities virtually never coincide with
best response. This is not surprising as subjects are given no initial information about their payoﬀ
functions. Instead, quantities tend to roughly follow the diagonal at high quantities and exceed
it at low quantities. This is roughly consistent with IMIT, where players imitate high-quantity
counterparts, and out-produce low-quantity counterparts.
The right panel aggregates all later data. Although best response fares no better in the long
run, there is a clear change in behavior. Quantities (except at the sparsely populated upper end)
are tightly bunched along the diagonal, consistent with MATCH.
Figure 6 provides analogous graphs for Triopoly, with average counterpart t − 1 quantities on
the x-axis. The pattern for both early and later responses are similar to (though noisier than) that
observed in Duopoly.
The complete absence of BR in the adjustment data is mirrored in data from post-experimental
questionnaires, reported in Appendix A.3. Fully incentivized elicitation of subjects' beliefs regarding
the direction of better replies in the stage game revealed that the vast majority of subjects were
aware that one could proﬁtably deviate from the JPM. However, they never acquired systematic
knowledge of the rough shape of the best-reply correspondence. For example, very few subjects
realized that the best reply against the CNE proﬁle is the CNE action. Rather they believed that
higher quantities would be more proﬁtable. Appendix A.2 reports further evidence on the irrelevance
of BR in explaining subjects' behavior.
Result 4 Subjects both in the short and long run show no tendency towards best response.
The aggregate data suggest that subjects begin some sort of behavioral transition after around
40-60 periods. To investigate, we collected all1 individual quantity choices xit and, using OLS with
robust standard errors clustered at the subject level, ﬁtted them to the following equation:
xit − xit−1 = α + β1(x−it−1 − xit−1) + β2(ht−1 − xit−1) (4)
+ β3sign(x
i
t−1 − xit−2)sign(piit−1 − piit−2) + it
The explanatory variables correspond to heuristics deﬁned in section 2:
1Coeﬃcient estimates are qualitatively similar but larger if we examine only observations with xit+1 6= xit.
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• The intercept α reﬂects a possible overall trend in the quantity chosen.
• MATCH refers to the player's adjustment towards the average action x−it−1 by other players,
so perfect adherence to that model would yield coeﬃcient β1 = 1.
• Coeﬃcient β2 picks up the additional weight placed on imitation (IMIT) of the highest action
ht−1 = maxj=1,...,n x
j
t−1, beyond its contribution to the average.
• WCLR is 1 or -1 or 0 depending on whether the most recent change in proﬁt has the same
sign as the corresponding change in quantity, or the opposite sign, or there was no change in
proﬁt or quantity. The coeﬃcient β3 estimates the step size.
Can statistical models of this form actually identify and diﬀerentiate underlying adjustment heuris-
tics? Some skepticism is warranted because speciﬁcations like this raise endogeneity issues, and
because behavior at the boundaries of the action space can also derail identiﬁcation. To deal with
such questions, we report in Appendix B estimates using simulated data. The simulations use agents
programmed to follow speciﬁc heuristics including MATCH, IMIT, WCLR and BR, and have the
same number of observations (with the same clustering structure) as in our experiment with human
subjects. The results suggest that in practice the estimation actually can do a pretty good job of
discriminating among the underlying heuristics. Most importantly, the simulation exercise suggests
that we can expect to strongly identify and diﬀerentiate the MATCH and IMIT rules from one
another.2
We estimate equation (4) on the ﬁrst 50 periods of data and then separately on the ﬁnal 50
periods of data to examine changes in the dynamic adjustment process. We also include estimates
on the 1100 periods between these two endpoints. Under the hypothesis that subjects rely mainly
on IMIT at the beginning of the session, we expect β1 to be indistinguishable from zero and β2 to be
signiﬁcantly positive. Under the hypothesis that subjects move to MATCH we expect the reverse:
β1 should be signiﬁcantly positive and β2 should drop to zero.
Results are presented in Table 3. In both Duopoly and Triopoly, we observe the same pattern: β2
is signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst 50 periods, replaced by β1 in the ﬁnal 50. Between, results are intermediate
but show a movement from IMIT to MATCH. Coeﬃcients are below 1 in most cases, but this is
likely due to an inevitable censoring problem facing this type of model. The subjects who are most
2The one heuristic that is diﬃcult to identify in simulations is BR, the best response rule. The simulations suggest
that the BR variable will artiﬁcially show up as statistically signiﬁcant regardless of the actual rule agents follow.
Happily, robust evidence from the data and from incentivized quizzes allow us to rule out BR prior to estimation.
This allows us to avoid these identiﬁcation issues by excluding the BR variable from our empirical speciﬁcations.
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likely to imitate are also the most likely in any given period to hold quantities identical to their
counterparts. These subjects contribute nothing to the estimate of these slope terms, so we expect
these estimates to be systematically downward biased. This problem is attenuated in Triopoly
where imitation of average quantities does not necessarily entail holding quantities identical to all
other players. As a result, we see larger estimates in Triopoly than in Duopoly.
Two other patterns are worth noting. First, there is evidence that subjects follow the WCLR
heuristic to some degree. This shows up in all estimates but is stronger later on in both Duopoly
and Triopoly. In late-period data the term is quite robust to the window used for the estimate in
Duopoly but is somewhat fragile in Triopoly. Our interpretation is that WCLR is stronger and less
noisy in Duopoly than in Triopoly. Finally, there is a signiﬁcant negative trend in the early-period
data in both Duopoly and Triopoly. We suspect that this also arises from a boundary problem.
Subjects tend to adjust their quantities frequently at the beginning of the experiment but quantities
are located, on average, quite close to the Walrasian equilibrium, a boundary in the action space.
This combination will tend to drive the mean adjustment below zero when subjects hold identical
quantities. Indeed, regressions on simulated IMIT agents, reported in Appendix B, also show
signiﬁcant negative trends even though these agents are not programmed to move autonomously in
either direction.
Result 5 While subjects tend to follow IMIT in the ﬁrst 50 periods, they switch to MATCH later.
There is also evidence that subjects follow WCLR to some degree throughout.
This seemingly innocuous result makes a powerful diﬀerence in evolution of behavior. By ridding
themselves from the tempting but fallacious IMIT heuristic, subjects are able to avoid extreme
competition and begin to increase proﬁts. Indeed, dissatisfaction with low payoﬀs and an awareness
of an outcome region with collectively much higher payoﬀs probably is the reason that subjects
abandon IMIT. Inspection of many Duopoly and Triopoly matches over 400 periods suggests that
in some matches this abandonment happens more or less simultaneously, while in other matches
a single player takes the lead, reducing her own quantity to demonstrate to her counterparts that
higher payoﬀs are available.
Result 5 also shows the importance of long horizons in low information environments. With
previous technology 40-60 periods were considered suﬃcient to observe long-run behavior. We now
see that that horizon coincided with the turning point, where the allure of IMIT wears oﬀ.
The MATCH rule to which our subjects switch may seem excessively simpleminded, but it turns
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Table 3: Coeﬃcient estimates from equation (4).
Duopoly
Coeﬃcient Measures First 50 Periods Between Final 50 Periods
α Intercept -0.35 -0.03 0
(0.10)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.03)
β1 MATCH 0.01 0.24 0.32
(0.044) (0.03)∗∗∗ (0.043)∗∗∗
β2 IMIT 0.59 0.10 0.10
(0.10)∗∗∗ (0.04)∗∗∗ (0.07)
β3 WCLR 0.18 0.09 0.18
(0.05)∗∗∗ (0.02)∗∗∗ (0.07)∗∗∗
Triopoly
Coeﬃcient Measures First 50 Periods Between Final 50 Periods
α Intercept -0.42 -0.09 0.01
(0.06)∗∗∗ (0.02)∗∗∗ (0.05)
β1 MATCH -0.05 0.25 0.56
(0.05) (0.06)∗∗∗ (0.16)∗∗∗
β2 IMIT 0.66 0.14 -0.00
(0.069)∗∗∗ (0.045)∗∗∗ (0.083)
β3 WCLR 0.13 0.05 0.09
(0.04)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.05)∗
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out to be remarkably eﬀective in sustaining collusion. First, as MATCH assures that players are
close together, the WCLR component helps them to transverse the quantity region from outcomes
close to PCW straight through the CNE into the collusive region. Reducing quantities in parallel
beneﬁts everybody, so in WCLR everybody continues to reduce quantity. Second, once players are
in the collusive region, simple MATCH also ensure an alignment of incentives that helps keep them
there. Indeed, MATCH eﬀectively justiﬁes conjectural variations of +1  the belief that others
will quickly match any change in quantity  and thus players have the incentive to reduce quantity
whenever it exceeds the JPM. Third, MATCH provides eﬀective punishment for deviations, similar
to Tit-for-Tat, even with no knowledge of the best response.
Figure 7 illustrates these points using data from particular matched groups in the ﬁnal 400
period block. Individual subjects' actions are plotted in red, green and (in Triopoly) blue. In the
Duopoly example, subjects closely track one another through a slow decline towards collusion. At
around period 20 actions level out but after a few dozen periods of testing the earnings impact of
increasing or decreasing joint quantities, the subjects begin moving decisively downwards, reaching
collusion after over 100 periods of play. After achieving full collusion, the subjects occasionally
defect but the MATCH rule leads to automatic punishment, reminding subjects that gains from
unilateral deviations will be ﬂeeting. Collusion collapses only in the last few periods of the block.
Similar patterns emerge in Triopoly, but with less exploration of the action space and, perhaps as
a result, quantities stall out above fully collusive levels.
Appendix A shows a more comprehensive view of such patterns for all of the subjects in the
dataset. It contains bar-code like diagrams for which we partitioned the state space into three
regions: competitive (if all players' payoﬀs are below the CNE payoﬀ), collusive (if all players'
payoﬀs are above the CNE payoﬀ), and other (where some earn more and some earn less than the
CNE payoﬀ). Every period is represented by a single color-coded bar with red representing the
competitive region, green collusive and black other. These ﬁgures show one of the more remarkable
features of the data  namely how after a deviation from the collusive region occurs (that is after
a change from green to black) play almost always moves into the competitive region (that is into
the red) before returning back to collusive play. This is MATCH in action, providing punishment
and forgiveness, very much like tit-for-tat.
The plots also clearly demonstrate that subjects do not get tired despite the large number of
repetitions. On the contrary, their reaction time decreases and alertness to deviations increases,
rendering play ever more eﬃcient as time goes by. One can see that punishment phases get shorter
and collusive spells get longer. In the ﬁrst block, the average collusive spell lasts 24.4 periods in
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Figure 7: Examples from the data illustrating MATCH behavior.
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Duopoly and 2.8 periods in Triopoly. This increases to 139.2 and 38 in the second block and, ﬁnally,
reaches 174.2 and 67.2 in the last block. On the other hand, the average consecutive time spent in
non-collusive regions, conditional on a defection from collusion, drops in Duopoly from 68 to 56.6 to
13.8. This pattern is slightly diﬀerent in Triopoly where the respective ﬁgures are 86, 142, and 90.1,
illustrating how much more complicated punishment and subsequent aligned return to collusion is
with three players.
5.2 Simulating a mixed process
In order to see whether a simple mixed process consisting of IMIT, MATCH, and WCLR can indeed
generate the data patterns we observe we run simulations based on (4) using the various behavioral
weights from the experimental data. With probability 1− e the program chose the action
xit = x
i
t−1 + β1(x
−i
t−1 − xit−1) + β2(ht−1 − xit−1) + β3sign(xit−1 − xit−2)sign(piit−1 − piit−2).
With the remaining probability e the program chose an action at random according to a uniform
distribution with support on the interval [xL, xH ]. The ﬁrst two periods were also randomly gener-
ated. We have simulated early and late behavior using the coeﬃcients for the ﬁrst and the last 50
periods taken from Table 3.
Table 4 reports the resulting medians and means of this simulation exercise along with the
experimentally observed values. Overall the simulated process tracks the experimental data quite
well. Note, however, that the noise rate required to replicate the experimental data is rather low in
the late Duopoly simulations, as compared to the other simulations. This can be seen as evidence
for more settled behavior in the Duopoly experiments, where many duopolies have managed to
sustain perfect collusion in later periods. In contrast, early behavior in duopolies and triopolies and
late behavior in triopolies appears to be still rather noisy.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
We believe our study makes three fundamental contributions. First, it shows the relevance of long
horizons in a low information environment. Thus it sheds light on the relative importance of the
amount of experienced feedback as opposed to the mere passing of time. Previously, behavior
after some 50 periods was generally considered suﬃcient experience to observe settled behavior.
Now we see that the technical limitations of earlier software (for which implementation of longer
horizons was impractical) meant that important aspects of learning in the long run were simply
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Table 4: Simulation results for Duopoly and Triopoly
Coeﬃcients from ﬁrst 50 periods
Duopoly Triopoly
First 50 periods Exp. Data Sim. Data Exp. Data Sim. Data
Noise e 0.1 0.1
Median 4.54 4.3 3.46 3.44
Mean 4.22 4.11 3.07 3.21
Coeﬃcients from last 50 periods
Last block Exp. Data Sim. Data Exp. Data Sim. Data
Noise e 0.02 0.1
Median 0.28 0.37 2.08 2.06
Mean 1.34 1.05 2.01 2.04
missed. Interestingly, time as such (providing subjects with the opportunity to analyze the game
through cognition) turns out not to be the major bottleneck. Behavior in the ﬁrst 50 periods of
our experiment nicely mirrors behavior observed in earlier studies although in our experiment 50
periods take just under four minutes while in previous studies over an hour would have passed. In
other words, multiplying the clock time for consideration by a factor of ten to twenty seems (in
the case of Cournot games at least) not to make a diﬀerence. Conversely, increasing the amount of
feedback or sheer repetition changes the picture dramatically.
Second, we see how additional repetitions with moderately informative feedback help subjects
to learn their way out of a superﬁcially attractive but ultimately fallacious heuristic. Eventually
imitation of successful others ceases to be attractive. Subjects learn that they are hurting them-
selves and are able to overcome their initial impulse to copy what has made others relatively more
successful. Escape is possible even from a devilishly baited trap.
Third, we oﬀer a new perspective on the emergence of cooperation. Subjects replace mal-adapted
imitation by other heuristics. Interestingly, these other heuristics are neither more complicated nor
more obviously sophisticated: they are just better suited to the repeated-game setting. Subjects
learn that it is in their collective interest to produce small quantities. They move into collusive
territory through alignment of actions and a local (win-continue, lose-reverse) search heuristic. By
mutually matching quantities, subjects teach one another that their actions will be shadowed by
others in the future, encouraging search for high collective payoﬀs (rather than search for individual
best response). This is reminiscent of the old literature on conjectural variations (Friedman 1977). In
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our experiment, subjects do not just have to believe that others will match their action adjustments;
they actually experience it ﬁrst hand. Consequently, they learn over time that deviations from
cooperation do not pay and the ever increasing length of collusive spells in our data impressively
conﬁrms this emerging sophistication.
While the heuristics we model and simulate are purely backward-looking, it is clear that the
improvements over the three blocks of 400 periods  the longer spells of cooperation and the shorter
length of punishment cycles  point to a signiﬁcant element of forward-looking behavior. However,
subjects do not acquire the rationality assumed in folk theorems. In fact, they never learn to best
reply (not even for the most relevant of strategy proﬁles). In some sense, of course, this does not
matter. Subjects do not play the one-shot game; they play a repeated game. And what they learn
about the repeated game is just enough for achieving collectively rational outcomes that are, from
an as-if perspective, seductively similar to the predictions of the theory of repeated games.
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Table 5: Mean quantities, prices, and proﬁts
Duopoly Triopoly
Periods Quantity Price Proﬁt Quantity Price Proﬁt
1− 50 4.22 17.26 27.81 3.07 13.97 19.32
1− 400 2.95 82.58 40.53 2.80 18.84 22.05
401− 800 1.54 259.33 54.57 2.60 33.57 23.98
801− 1, 200 1.34 286.50 56.61 2.01 74.66 29.92
1151− 1200 1.48 276.75 55.16 2.03 85.51 29.71
A Additional Analysis
A.1 Proﬁt Time Series
Figures 8 and 9 plot proﬁts over time and are analogous to Figures 2 and 3. Top, middle and bottom
dotted horizontal lines represent Cartel, Nash and Walrasian proﬁt levels, respectively. The plots
suggest that subjects' proﬁts fall well below Nash levels in the ﬁrst 50 periods and rise above Nash
levels in the long run.
A.2 Mean quantities, prices, and proﬁts
Table 5, in analogy to Table 2, shows mean quantities, proﬁts, and prices each of our three blocks
and for the ﬁrst and last 50 periods.
A.3 Failure of Best Response Over Time
In this section, we provide evidence that subjects never in the aggregate experience a period of
consistent best response. Figure 10 provides 6 panels. Each corresponds to a 1-point range of
counterparts' previous period average quantity (ranges are listed above each plot). In each range
the range of best responses is demarcated by dashed horizontal blue lines. Dashed horizontal red
lines provide the bounds for imitating average quantity. The x-axis of each panel plots period. Data
is binned into 50 period intervals and the black line plots medians. Figure 11 provides analogous
data for Triopoly.
It is evident from these ﬁgures that median quantities very seldom enter the blue bounds of best
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Figure 8: Median proﬁts in early periods
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Figure 9: Median proﬁts in all periods, plotted in 20 period bins.
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Duopoly
Choice other Alternatives
Q. x2 x
1
1 x
2
1 correct
D1 3 1 3∗ 12/12
D2 3 3∗ 6 0/12
D3 1.15 1.15 2.31∗ 12/12
D4 6 2.49∗ 6 6/12
Triopoly
Choices others Alternatives
Q. x2 x3 x
1
1 x
2
1 correct
T1 4 4 1.8∗ 4 4/12
T2 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.35∗ 9/12
T3 0.1 0.1 1.35∗ 4 5/12
T4 2.66 2.66 0.75 2.66∗ 11/12
T5 2.66 2.66 2.66∗ 4 0/12
Table 6: Best response quiz. Correct answers are denoted by an asterisk.
response, and that the exceptions are isolated, not bunched. The data therefore are inconsistent
with subjects entering a phase of best response at the aggregate level. Instead, plotted datatend to
increase from panel to panel after early periods, consistent with the MATCH heuristic.
A.4 Incentivized Quiz Results
At the end of some of the later sessions, subjects were shown printouts of screens similar to the
ones used in the experiment. Markers denoted the counterparts' strategies and two slider positions
indicated two possible strategies available. Subjects were asked to circle the slider that would earn
the higher payoﬀ in the one-shot game given the counterparts' strategies, and they received a cash
payment of $0.50 for each correct answer. Table 6 summarizes the questions and reports on the
fraction of correct answers.
Questions D1 and T4 asked whether the CNE quantity or a lower quantity gives a higher proﬁt
against the other(s) choosing the CNE quantity. Almost everybody had this question correct,
indicating that subjects are aware that downward deviations from the CNE are not proﬁtable. D2
and T5 asked a similar question: is an upward deviation from the CNE proﬁt increasing? Strikingly,
30
Figure 10: Response to counterpart actions over time in Duopoly.
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Figure 11: Response to counterpart actions over time in Triopoly.
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nobody had this question correct. D4 and T1 asked whether subjects would choose a best response
to the PCW-outcome or would go for the PCW outcome themselves. The message that emerges is
somehow mixed: in Duopoly half of the subjects belief that the PCW-quantity earns higher proﬁts
than the best response and in Triopoly 3/4 of the subjects held this belief. D3 and T2 asked whether
individual proﬁts are higher at a (rather) collusive outcome or when deviating to a higher quantity.
Everybody had this answer correct in Duopoly and 3/4 had this answer right in Triopoly. Thus,
almost everybody was aware that it pays oﬀ to deviate from the collusive outcome. Finally, T3
asked whether subjects think that the PCW outcome gives a high payoﬀ than the best response
when the others collude. 7/12 subjects had this question wrong. The overall message that emerges
from this exercise is that subjects at best have a rather blurred picture of the game and their optimal
strategy choice.
A.5 Bar codes and Punishment
We partition the state space into three regions: competitive (if all players' payoﬀs are below the
CNE payoﬀ), collusive (if all players' payoﬀs are above the CNE payoﬀ), and other (where some
earn more and some earn less than the CNE payoﬀ). We color-code these regions red (competitive),
green (collusive) and black (other). Figures 5 and 6 plot transition probabilities over time for
movements between these regions. Figures 7 to 12 show bar codes where every period is represented
by a single color-coded bar indicating in which region subjects stayed in every period. These ﬁgures
show one of the more remarkable features of the data  namely how, after a deviation from the
collusive region occurs (that is after a change from green to black), play almost always moves into
the competitive region (that is into the red) before returning back to collusive play.
Subjects' reaction speeds get faster from block to block and punishment phases get shorter and
shorter in duopolies. For triopolies, we see how this process is nosier and slower, refecting the more
diﬃcult coordination problem.
The transition probabilities demonstrate several features of the data set: They show the in-
creasing stability of collusion for both duopolies and triopolies. And they show how rare are direct
transitions from collusive to competitive and vice versa. Almost all changes occur via other,
reﬂecting individual defections (rather than common dissatisfaction with collusive outcomes) and
demonstrating that forgiveness and repentance occur subsequently rather than simultaneously.
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Figure 12: Transition probabilities, Duopoly.
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Figure 13: Transition probabilities, Triopoly.
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Figure 14: Bar codes from Block 1, Duopoly.
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Figure 15: Bar codes from Block 2, Duopoly.
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Figure 16: Bar codes from Block 3, Duopoly.
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Figure 17: Bar codes from Block 1, Triopoly.
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Figure 18: Bar codes from Block 2, Triopoly.
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Figure 19: Bar codes from Block 3, Triopoly.
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B Observable Implications of Dynamic Models
Can one actually tell the diﬀerence between, say, IMIT behavior and MATCH behavior in data
like ours using standard econometric techniques as in section 5.1? Empirical models examining
intertemporal adjustment are vulnerable to a host of empirical problems, particularly endogeneity,
that have the potential to derail identiﬁcation of underlying adjustment rules. To better understand
what we can expect to infer from actual data, we simulate each of the models of interest, and then
use standard econometric techniques (the same ones used in section 5.1) to try to recover the true
parameters used to generate the simulated data.
For example, our IMIT simulation initializes each player's ﬁrst period choice using an inde-
pendent draw from the uniform distribution over [xL, xU ]. With probability 0.05 each subsequent
choice for that player is drawn independently from the same distribution, but with probability 0.95
is instead set equal to the highest quantity chosen by any player (including self) in the previous
period. We simulate 18 sets of 400 period duopolies and 12 sets of triopolies, the same size and
shape as the data set collected in the laboratory, and analyze that simulated data in the second
pair of columns in Table B.
We run simulations of the same size using each of the other three adaptive rules discussed
above. The ﬁrst pair of columns in Table B replaces IMIT with 0.95 probability with BR (to the
last period's proﬁle) with 0.95 probability. A literal interpretation of MATCH leads to blinkers
in Duopoly (players alternate out of phase between two arbitrary actions), so we apply the 0.95
probability instead to an equal mix of no-change and MATCH; results are reported in the third pair
of columns. Finally, the last pair of columns applies the 0.95 probability to the WCLR algorithm
with ﬁxed step size 0.10. Of course, the simulation truncates the action at the endpoints xL, xU .
3
The table reports coeﬃcient estimates from the OLS regression (with clustered standard errors)
xit − xit−1 = α+ β1(x−it−1 − xit−1) + β2(ht−1 − xit−1) + (5)
β3sign(x
i
t−1 − xit−2)sign(piit−1 − piit−2) + β4(b(X−it−1)− xit−1) + it
of quantity adjustments xit − xit−1 by each player i in periods t = 2, ..., 400. Thus the speciﬁcation
is identical to that in equation (4) with the inclusion of the additional explanatory variable BR,
the player's adjustment towards the best response b(X−it−1) to the other players' actions last period.
3 Results are qualitatively similar (with obvious quantitative changes) for other values e of the Noise level than
e = 0.05, and for other noise distributions than uniform iid, e.g., additive. It may be worth noting that the diﬀerence
of two iid uniform realizations is triangular, unimodal and symmetric around 0.
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Duopoly Simulations ALL DATA
Variable BR Sim IMIT Sim MATCH Sim WCLR Sim
Intercept 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.11 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.08
(0.003)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.011) (0.007)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.004) (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.007)∗∗∗
IMIT -0.01 -0.32 0.97 1.000 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06
(0.016) (0.025)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.027) (0.028) (0.009)∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗
MATCH 0.01 0.66 0.01 0.01 0.49 0.52 0.01 0.05
(0.014) (0.018)∗∗∗ (0.008) (0.008) (0.021)∗∗∗ (0.021)∗∗∗ (0.006) (0.005)∗∗∗
WCLR 0.002 0.177 0.006 0.018 0.016 0.05 0.10 0.11
(0.007) (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.021) (0.021) (0.031) (0.03)∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗
BR 1.00 0.03 0.06 0.05
(0.012)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗
Triopoly Simulations
Variable BR Sim IMIT Sim MATCH Sim WCLR Sim
Intercept -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.09 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 0.03
(0.005)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.012)∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.004) (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.007)∗∗∗
IMIT -0.00 0.51 0.94 0.99 0.02 0.02 0.002 -0.02
(0.016) (0.029)∗∗∗ (0.02)∗∗∗ (0.016)∗∗∗ (0.021) (0.022) (0.008) (0.008)∗∗
MATCH 0.00 0.19 0.03 0.01 0.45 0.48 0.01 0.05
(0.013) (0.02)∗∗∗ (0.014)∗∗ (0.014) (0.018)∗∗∗ (0.019)∗∗∗ (0.007) (0.006)∗∗∗
WCLR 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.09 0.10
(0.005) (0.01) (0.012) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗
BR 0.99 0.03 0.05 0.04
(0.012)∗∗∗ (0.007)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗
Table 7: Recovering the Data Generating Process. Simulations all include 0.05 noise. MATCH steps are
taken with probability 0.50, and WCLR step size is 0.10. Standard errors are in parentheses. One asterisk
indicates signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level, two at the 0.01 level and three at the 0.001 level.
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Notice that the column pairs of the table report two ﬁts to the simulation data, one with the
augmented speciﬁcation just mentioned and the other with speciﬁcation (4) excluding BR.
In most cases we recover reasonable approximations of the true generating process. For example,
the ﬁrst column reports estimates of the BR response coeﬃcient that are quite precise and not too
far from the true value of 0.95, while other coeﬃcient estimates are insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from the
true value of zero. The main discrepancy is the statistically signiﬁcant (but rather small) artifactual
trends implied by the intercepts. This is an artifact arising in most speciﬁcations.
Perhaps the most serious problem disclosed by the table is the consistently positive and highly
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient estimates for the BR variable in simulations where the true data generating
process does not involve any BR in the mix. Running additional simulations and looking at his-
tograms discloses that these artifacts are larger when the data have large modes near an endpoint.
Then random (or other) moves towards the interior are picked up by the BR variable, which always
lies in the interior of the action space. This problem persists even if we estimate Tobit instead of
OLS models, suggesting that the BR variable is robustly diﬃcult to properly identify using adjust-
ment models of this sort. Note that simply dropping the problematic BR variable (as we do in the
second speciﬁcation for each model) leads to wildly artiﬁcial parameter estimates when BR is the
true data generating process.
As it turns out, these issues are largely moot. As we document in the body of the paper, we
ﬁnd overwhelming evidence both from non-parametric analysis of the data and from diagnostic
incentivized quizzes that subjects do not employ BR. We therefore will drop the BR variable and
employ our second speciﬁcation in our main empirical analysis.
A ﬁnal issue highlighted by the simulations is that WCLR generates statistically signiﬁcant
results for every coeﬃcient in the model. However, notice that the step size of the WCLR process
is recovered with almost perfect accuracy (0.10) whereas all other coeﬃcients are very small (in
particular in comparison to the simulations that are based on them) and the IMIT coeﬃcient is
even negative.
Although this simulation exercise shows that we can get reasonable parameter recovery from
this empirical approach, it is most useful for demonstrating that we can meaningfully distinguish
adaptive rules from another to a great degree. Importantly:
• IMIT and MATCH can be clearly distinguished from one another; IMIT simulations do not
generate signiﬁcant MATCH coeﬃcients and vice versa.
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• Unlike IMIT and MATCH, WCLR generates signiﬁcant variables for both IMIT and MATCH.
Thus pure WCLR can be distinguished from either of these two adjustment rules.
These results give us conﬁdence that our straightforward econometric techniques can distinguish
among the relevant adjustment processes in our experimental data.
C Instructions
These are the instructions used in both Duopoly and Triopoly sessions. In the instructions we used
the term period to refer to what the paper calls blocks and subperiods to refer to what the
paper calls periods.
Instructions
Welcome! This is an economics experiment. If you pay close attention to these instructions, you
can earn a signiﬁcant sum of money, which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the last period.
Please remain silent and do not look at other participants' screens. If you have any questions, or
need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and we will come to you. If you disrupt the
experiment by talking, laughing, etc., you may be asked to leave and may not be paid. We expect
and appreciate your cooperation today.
The Basic Idea
The experiment will be divided into a number of periods and in each period you will be anonymously
matched with one or two other players via the computer. Each period will be further divided into
a number of subperiods. In each subperiod you and your counterparts will secretly select strategies
and at the end of the subperiod the combination of your and your counterparts' strategies will
determine your earnings for the subperiod.
We will not tell you exactly how earnings are determined but here are a few facts:
• Your earnings in each subperiod depend entirely on your strategy and your counterparts'
strategies, and nothing else.
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• The function that determines your earnings will not change over the course of the experiment.
That is, if you and your counterparts use the same strategies at time A as at time B, you both
will all have the same earnings at time A as at time B.
• Your earnings are symmetric with your counterparts'. In particular, if you and your counter-
parts all choose the same strategy, then you all will earn the same amount.
The screen display
Figure 1 [identical to Figure 1 in the paper ] shows the computer display you will use to make
decisions and interact with your counterpart. At the top of the screen is a bar showing elapsed time
in the current subperiod. When the bar ﬁlls up the subperiod is over and a new subperiod will
immediately begin. Your strategy is the location (from left to right) of the black square slider at
the bottom of the screen. During each subperiod you can freely adjust your tentative strategy by
clicking on the screen or dragging the slider. Your actual strategy for the subperiod is the location
of your slider at the end of the subperiod.
When the subperiod is over you will be shown a green dot visualizing your payoﬀ rate from
that subperiod. The higher the dot, the higher the payoﬀ earned. The precise payoﬀ number is
shown ﬂoating next to the dot. You will also be shown blue and red hash marks at the bottom
of the screen showing the location of your counterparts' strategies in the last subperiod and blue
and red dots representing your counterparts' payoﬀs from the subperiod that just ended (if you
are matched with only one other participant you will only see blue hash marks and dots).
It is important to keep in mind that your counterparts' strategies, your payoﬀ dot and your
counterparts' payoﬀ dots always display outcomes from last subperiod. You will not learn
payoﬀs or your counterpart's strategy from the current subperiod until after the subperiod is over.
Earnings
Your earnings will be given in points. Point totals reported after each subperiod are given as
payoﬀ rates, i.e., the payoﬀ you would receive for the entire period if you acted the same way
each subperiod. Your actual point earnings for a single subperiod can be calculated by dividing
the payoﬀ number reported by the number of subperiods in the current period. For example, if the
period contains 50 subperiods and your payoﬀ dot shows earnings rate of 200 in the last subperiod,
then you actually earned 200/50 = 4 points in that subperiod.
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Table 8: Static outcomes for the linear payoﬀ function
Duopoly Triopoly
xi P pii xi P pii
JPM 3 6 28 2 6 22
CNE 4 4 26 3 3 19
PCW 6 0 10 4 0 10
Your points will accumulate over the course of the experiment. The screen will always display
your Current Earnings during the period so far and Previous Earnings accumulated over previous
periods. You will be paid cash for points earned at a rate written on the white board at the front
of the room.
Frequently asked questions
Q1. Is this some kind of psychological experiment with an agenda you haven't told us?
Answer. No. It is an economics experiment. If we do anything deceptive or don't pay you cash
as described then you can complain to the campus Human Subjects Committee and we will be
in serious trouble. These instructions are meant to clarify the game and show you how you earn
money; our interest is simply in seeing how people make decisions.
D On-line Appendix
D.1 Comparison to linear demand
To document the comparison to linear demand consider the inverse demand function P = 12− nx¯.
We summarize the relevant benchmarks for this case in Table 8.
Under our unit elastic demand function, switching to the best response to the JPM-quantity of
the other player yields an increase of proﬁts by 58.9% in Duopoly. In Triopoly this temptation is
even higher, as the best response to the JPM quantities increases proﬁts by 106.2% Note that the
temptations to deviate from the JPM-outcome are much lower in the corresponding linear demand
case where a deviator can expect only a 8% rise in proﬁts in Duopoly and a 18.2% increase in
Triopoly.
To see that for the unit elastic demand function the payoﬀ function is not as ﬂat around the
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best response as in the case of a linear demand function for n < 6 note the following. Under linear
demand the FOC is 0 = dφidxi = 12−(n−1)x¯−i−2xi and payoﬀ curvature is determined by
d2φi
dx2i
= −2.
By contrast, for our constant elasticity speciﬁcation, FOC is 0 = dpiidxi =
120∑
j
xj
− 10− 120xi
(
∑
j
xj)2
, and
payoﬀ curvature is determined by d
2pii
dx2i
= −240
(
∑
j
xj)2
+ 240xi
(
∑
j
xj)3
. Substituting for the last term from the
FOC and simplifying yields d
2pii
dx2i
= −20nx∗ , where the symmetric NE quantity is x
∗ = 12n−1
n2
. Hence for
n = 6 we have d
2pii
dx2i
= −20
(12) 5
6
= −2, the same as for d2φi
dx2i
, but for lesser n we have d
2pii
dx2i
< −2 = d2φi
dx2i
.
D.2 Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies
To show that the CNE is the unique point in the serially undominated set, let us ﬁrst consider the
derivative of the proﬁt function. If this derivative is positive a higher quantity will lead to higher
proﬁts and if it is negative decreasing one's quantity is proﬁt increasing. We have
∂pii(xi, X−i)
∂xi
=
120
xi +X−i
− 10− 120xi
(xi +X−i)2
.
We have ∂pii(xi,X−i)∂xi > 0 if 0 < xi < 3 and
X−i(xi) < X−i < X¯−i(xi) (6)
where X−i(xi) = 6−2
√
3
√
3− xi−xi and X¯−i(xi) = 6+2
√
3
√
3− xi−xi. Note that (6) represents
the set of quantities of the other players for which a quantity increase pays oﬀ. Likewise, we have
∂pii(xi,X−i)
∂xi
< 0 if
xi > 3 (7)
or if 0 < xi ≤ 3 and
X−i > X¯−i(xi) (8)
The previous two inequalities capture cases where, depending on the own quantity and the quantity
chosen by the others, a quantity decrease results in higher proﬁts.
Duopoly: Consider an interval of the form [xL, xˆU ]. Note that by (7) we know that a slight quan-
tity decrease will earn strictly higher proﬁts (regardless of the quantity X−i chosen by the other) if
xi > 3. Since at an upper bound no quantity increase is possible all upper bounds 3 < xˆU ≤ 6 are
strictly dominated by a lower quantity. Iteratively applying this argument, starting from xU = 6,
shows that all upper bounds 3 < xˆU ≤ 6 are iteratively strictly dominated. Now consider any
interval of the form [xˆL, 3]. The set of quantities of the other player for which an increase in the
own quantity results in higher proﬁts is given by: X−i(xˆL) < X−i < X¯−i(xˆL). We have X−i ≥ xˆL
and X−i ≤ xˆU . Thus, if X−i(xˆL) ≤ xˆL and X¯−i(xˆL) ≥ xˆU it pays oﬀ to increase one's quantity for
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any quantity chosen by the other player. Both inequalities hold for xˆL < 3. Thus, for any interval
of the form [xˆL, 3] the lower bound is strictly dominated by a higher quantity, showing that the
CNE quantity xi = 3 is the only serially undominated strategy.
Triopoly: Again, (8) reveals that as in duopoly all quantities xi > 3 are iteratively strictly domi-
nated by some lower quantity. Thus, we have obtained a new undominated upper bound x0U = 3.
Now consider intervals of the form [x′L, 3). Consider (6) and note that we have X−i ≥ 2x′L and
X−i ≤ 6. We have X−i(x′L) < 2x′L whenever x′L ≤ 3 and we have X¯−i(x′L) > 2x0U = 6 whenever
x′L < 6(
√
2− 1) = x0L. Thus, for all lower bounds x′L < x0L we can ﬁnd a proﬁt increasing deviation
if the others choose their quantities in the interval [x′L, 3). Thus, we have obtained a new lower
bound x0L = 6(
√
2− 1).
Consider now an interval [xˆL, xˆU ] with lower bound xˆL and upper bound xˆH with
3
2 < xˆL <
xˆU ≤ 3. By (8), it pays oﬀ to further reduce one's quantity for each upper bound xˆ′U that satisﬁes
X−i > X¯−i(xˆ′U ). We know that X−i ≥ 2xˆL. Thus, it pays oﬀ to further reduce one's quantity if
2xˆL > X¯−i(xˆ′U ). Provided that xˆL >
3
2 , this can be written as xˆ
′
U > f(xˆL) where
f(x) = 2
√
6x− 2x.
Thus, we have found a new upper bound xˆ′′U = f(xˆL).
By (6) it pays oﬀ to further increase one's quantity for each lower bound xˆ′L if X−i(xˆ
′
L) <
X−i < X¯−i(xˆ′L). Since X−i(xˆ
′
L) ≥ 2x′L, the ﬁrst inequality holds whenever xˆ′L < 3. Further,
we have X¯−i(xˆ′L) ≤ 2ˆxL if xˆU > 32 and xˆ′L < f(xˆU ). Hence, we have found a new lower bound
xˆ′′L = f(xˆU ).
The previous argument establishes that, for 32 < xˆL < 3 and
3
2 < xˆU ≤ 3, given an undominated
interval [xˆL, xˆU ] we can obtain a new undominated interval [f(xˆL), f(xˆU )]. We can now iterate
the function f(·) on this interval. By the intermediate value theorem, a suﬃcient condition for the
function f to be a contraction mapping is that |f ′(x)| < 1 which is the case whenever 23 < x < 6.
Thus f is a contraction mapping which, by the Banach ﬁxed point theorem, assures convergence
to the unique ﬁxed point x = f(x) = 83 . This, together with the previous observations that
x0L = 6(
√
2− 1) and x0U = 3, shows that the CNE is the only quantity in the serially undominated
set.
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